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Abstract. The recent development of location-based services has origi-
nated a set of new security services that address their particular security
problems. Spatial-temporal certification services are among these new
services. They have as main goal the generation of evidences about an
entity’s spatial-temporal information and, in general, their life-cycle sup-
port. Currently there is still a lack of a general framework for spatial-
temporal certification services. In this work it is presented such a
framework and an extension of the X.509 attribute certificate framework
and the SAML standard to represent spatial-temporal certificates.
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1 Introduction
Last decade has witnessed the development and commercial deployment of
location-based services. As some authors have pointed out, security is a major
challenge in location-aware computing [PMP03]. Trust (authenticity and at-
testation) and privacy of location information stand out as main security re-
quirements. Several mechanisms have been proposed to address trust of location
information, mainly location authentication protocols and spatial-temporal at-
testation services, which include spatial-temporal certification services. A brief
survey on mechanisms that address trust of location information can be found
in [GKRR05]. A survey on mechanisms to protect location privacy in pervasive
computing can be found in [GTH05].
This work focuses on spatial-temporal certification services. Although several
authors have proposed spatial-temporal certification models and mechanisms,
there is still a lack of a general framework that defines their goals, model and re-
quirements. This work presents a basic spatial-temporal certification framework
and an extension of the X.509 attribute certificate framework [ITU05] and the
SAML standard [OAS05] to represent spatial-temporal certificates.
Related work. During the last decade some spatial-temporal certification mod-
els and mechanisms have been proposed in [ZKK01, Bus04], but none of them
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addresses the definition of a general spatial-temporal framework, instead they
focus on specific application scenarios. Zugenmaier, Kreutzer and Kabatnik pro-
pose a model and a mechanism to provide location stamps for subscribers of
the GSM mobile network. Bussard defines a type of privacy-enhancing certifi-
cates which he proposes to use, among other applications, in location- and time-
stamping. Furthermore, neither Zugenmaier et al. nor Bussard do specify the
structure of the spatial-temporal certificates using any of the current attribute
certificate standards. Within IETF GEOPRIV WG, a location object format has
been defined for carrying location information on the Internet [IET05]; digital
signatures have been proposed to protect the integrity of this location object but
it is not meant to be a proper certificate. Besides, GEOPRIV, in collaboration
with the Open GIS Consortium [OGC06], is currently working on the definition
of an interoperable geodetic representation worth of taking into account.
Paper outline. Section 2 presents the basic spatial-temporal certification frame-
work and Section 3 the proposed extensions of the X.509 AC framework and the
SAML standard. Section 4 presents the conclusions and future work that have
been identified from this research.
2 Spatial-Temporal Certification Framework
2.1 Goal and General Model
Similar to the definition for non-repudiation services in [ISO97], spatial-temporal
certification services are defined as those services that generate, collect, maintain,
make available and validate evidences concerning the spatial-temporal informa-
tion of an entity. Spatial-temporal certification services must be provided, as
well, within the context of a security policy. Among their applications stand ac-
cess control to services or resources based on the location of the requester entity.
For example, an on-line gambling site may require that, in order to grant access
to the site, their clients must be located within some specific geographic area,
or a shopping centre may desire to grant privileges depending on users’ visiting
history. Another application is found in non-repudiation scenarios, e.g., to pro-
vide non-repudiation and accountability in the tracking of entities and assets,
such as mobile workers, vehicles, ships, hazardous materials or valuable assets.
In addition, spatial-temporal evidences can be used to provide non-repudiation
and accountability in location-based billing, as in automatic toll collection sys-
tems, for highway usage or for entrance in certain areas (high populated urban
areas or preserved environmental zones such as biosphere reserves).
Several entities performing a number of roles may be involved in the provi-
sion of spatial-temporal certification services (see Figure 1). First, the evidence
generation requester (RQ) is who requests the generation of a spatial-temporal
evidence. The spatial-temporal evidence generator (Ge), is in charge of generating
the evidences, and probably also collects, maintains and makes them available.
The evidence receiver (RC) is who obtains the spatial-temporal evidence after it
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(a) Phases: certificate generation; certificate transfer, storage and
retrieval; and certificate verification
(b) Phase: certificate use
Fig. 1. General model of spatial-temporal certification services (dispute resolution
phase is not shown)
has been issued. Evidence receivers should be able of verifying the evidence; the
spatial-temporal evidence verifier (Ve) performs this task.
The entity which the evidences refer to is the subject (S) of the evidence,
that is, the spatial-temporal information asserted in the evidence refer to the
subject. The subject must be, at least, a positionable device; in addition, the
subject of the evidence may also refer to the user controlling the target device.
Subjects should be uniquely identifiable according to some identification scheme.
It is assumed that the spatial-temporal information of the subject is securely
verified or authenticated before the evidence is generated. The verifier of location
(Vloc) performs this verification in collaboration with a positioning infrastructure
(PI); this process is done by executing a location authentication protocol (see a
description and an analysis of this kind of protocols in [GKRR05]). Note that
considering the user controlling the target device as part of the subject would
require to verify also the proximity of this particular user to that target device.
It is assumed that Ge trusts Vloc and PI to obtain authentic spatial-temporal
information about the subjects under certain security model.
The use of the evidence must be done within the context of the policy under
which the evidence has been issued. The evidence user or claimant (CL) is who
makes use of the spatial-temporal evidence to obtain some benefit (e.g., access
to some resource or some tax payment). The relying party (RP) is the entity that
provides some benefit to the claimant based on the evidence and maybe other
auxiliar information. An entity may assume several of the presented roles. Some
of them may be performed by trusted third parties (TTP) or trusted platform
modules (TPM). Other TTPs may also be involved in the service provision.
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Spatial-temporal certification services comprise mostly the same phases as
non-repudiation services do [ISO97] (see Figure 1 for the numbers in brackets):
– Certificate generation. RQ asks Ge to generate a spatial-temporal certificate
on certain subject S (step 1). Ge verifies the request and asks Vloc to locate
subject S at that moment (step 2). Vloc, in collaboration with PI, verifies
or authenticates the location of the subject (step 3) and returns to Ge this
information (step 4). Finally, Ge generates the spatial-temporal certificate.
– Certificate transfer, storage and retrieval. Ge may store the evidence in a
repository or transfer it to the receiver entity RC (steps 5 and 6). RC may
also retrieve the certificate from the repository by himself afterwards.
– Certificate verification. In this phase, RC requests Ve to verify the evidence
(step 7), who may need to retrieve the evidence or some additional informa-
tion (step 8). The result of the verification is returned to RC (step 9).
– Certificate use. The evidence should have been transferred either to CL or
to RP (step 10) and it is used by CL to obtain some benefit from RP (step
11). RP should verify the evidence before deciding to grant any benefit.
– Dispute resolution. If CL and RP do not agree regarding the benefit grant-
ing, both parties may leave the decision to an adjudicator, who will resolve
the dispute taking into account the available evidences and the policies under
which the evidences have been issued. This phase is not always needed.
2.2 Requirements
Establishment of trust on the evidence. Users of the evidence must be able
to establish trust on the information certified in the evidence; therefore:
R1.1. Evidences must bind a subject to certain spatial-temporal information.
R1.2. It must be possible to verify who is the evidence author (data origin
authentication) and that the evidence has not been modified (data integrity).
R1.3. It should be able to determine the source of the spatial-temporal infor-
mation asserted in an evidence and the method used to obtain it.
R1.4. It must be possible to determine the temporal validity of an evidence.
R1.5. It should be able to determine the accuracy of the spatial-temporal in-
formation asserted in the evidence.
R1.6. It may be able to bind a particular subject with several spatial-temporal
information tokens.
Spatial-temporal certification policy. As in non-repudiation services
[ISO97], spatial-temporal certification services must be provided within the con-
text of a particular spatial-temporal certification policy; therefore:
R2.1. It must be possible to determine the security policy under which a spatial-
temporal evidence has been issued.
Protection of spatial-temporal information privacy. Location information
is considered by many legislation corpus as personal data if it can be direct or
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indirectly associated to an identified or identifiable entity [Dir02]. It is usually
required that affected users consent the processing of their personal data after
having been informed of the characteristics of its processing. Spatial-temporal
evidences can be considered personal data as spatial-temporal information is
bound to some particular subject. These requirements have been identified:
R3.1. Users must be able to control the circumstances under which the spatial-
temporal information of their target devices is processed.
R3.2. As a consequence of requirement R3.1, confidentiality of spatial-temporal
information must be guaranteed according to user’s preferences.
R3.3. It should be able to determine which user’s privacy preferences concern
a certain spatial-temporal evidence.
R3.4. Spatial-temporal certificates may support use of privacy-enhancing cer-
tificates (such as the ones proposed in [Bus04]).
R3.5. Users may be able to specify bounds on spatial-temporal resolution to be
used in the spatial-temporal information included in evidences.
Supporting functionalities
R4.1. Support functionalities must be provided to generate, store, retrieve, ver-
ify, show and delete spatial-temporal evidences.
R4.2. Support may be provided to automatize some spatial-temporal processes
such as evidence generation.
R4.3. Support may be provided to automatize the enforcement of users’ privacy
preferences.
2.3 Mechanisms to Provide Spatial-Temporal Certification Services
Digital signatures are one of the most common mechanisms used to generate
digital evidences. In particular they have been standardized as the mechanism
to bind attributes to some entity in the ITU-T X.509 attribute certificate frame-
work [ITU05] and the mechanism to protect the integrity and the issuer authen-
tication of the assertions defined in the OASIS SAML standard [OAS05]. The
verification of certificates based on digital signatures usually consists in verifying
the signature’s correctness and validity. Both X.509 attribute certificates (or its
PKIX profile [IET02]) and SAML attribute assertions can be used as baseline
to define spatial-temporal certificates.
To fulfill requirement blocks 1 and 2, a spatial-temporal certificate generated
with a digital signature mechanism should contain the elements in the first col-
umn of Figure 2. Spatial-temporal attributes should allow the specification of
certain spatial information and its resolution, certain temporal information and
its resolution, the identifier of the spatial-temporal information provider and the
method used to obtain the position and time asserted in the attribute. Instead
of this classical certificate structure, some of the new privacy-enhancing certifi-
cate format recently proposed may be used (e.g., [Bus04]). Privacy-enhancing
certificates address in an elegant way some of the requirements in block 3, but
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other simpler solutions may also be used. For example, privacy can be provided
with access control mechanisms or encryption of spatial-temporal attributes;
these mechanisms can be complemented with the binding of the user’s privacy
preferences to the certificates. To provide support to this and future issues, it
is advisable that spatial-temporal certificates allow arbitrary extensions, signed
and unsigned. Finally, requirement block 4 should be provided by a certificate
management infrastructure as the ones proposed for the X.509 AC framework,
its PKIX profile or for SAML assertions.
3 Extension of X.509 Attribute Certificate Framework
and SAML Standard
In this Section, two basic spatial-temporal certificate structures are defined to
address requirement blocks 1 and 2. The X.509 attribute certificate framework
and the SAML standard are used as base. Most of the elements composing a
(classic) spatial-temporal certificate (as defined in Section 2.3) can find an equiv-
alent element in the X.509 attribute certificate and the SAML attribute assertion
structures. Figure 2 presents these pairs of equivalent elements and points out
which ones have no equivalent (the cells are shown with grey background). To
obtain a complete spatial-temporal certificate structure, X.509 attribute certifi-
cate and SAML assertion have to be extended in order to provide a solution
for the greyed elements. Both certificate structures defined in this work limit
subject’s location representation to geodetic information.
Fig. 2. Correspondence between elements of spatial-temporal certificate and elements
of X.509 attribute certificate and SAML attribute assertion. Greyed elements do not
have equivalent element. Those marked with (1) have an equivalent element but it must
be extended to fulfil spatial-temporal certificate requirements.
Basic X.509-based spatial-temporal certificate. In this case, the time of
generation may be expressed as a timeGeneration extension element defined as
GeneralizedTime. The certificatePolicies field defined in X.509 public-key
certificate framework can be used in this case to specify the spatial-temporal
6
Spatial-Temporal Certification Framework and Extension 327
certificate policy. X.509 attribute framework defines a general attribute certifi-
cate structure but application specific attributes must be defined as needed. A
spatial-temporal attribute may be defined as shown in Figure 3(a). Note that a
na¨ıve spatial information element has been specified using a latitude-longitude-
altitude tuple expressed in decimal degrees and meters but it should be desirable
to use a generalized spatial representation (such a representation may be found
in the ISO/TC 211 Geographic information/Geomatics standards).
Basic SAML-based spatial-temporal certificate. In this case, the
spatial-temporal policy element may be defined as an XML attribute of a new
SAML assertion (<SpatialTemporalAssertion>). Then, a new SAML
attribute statement (<SpatialTemporalStatement>) is defined to contain the
spatial-temporal attribute. Furthermore, four new SAML attributes are defined
to express the location, the time, the spatial information source (provider and
positioning method) and the temporal information source (see Figure 3(b)). Spa-
tial and temporal elements have been defined using types from the GML 3.1.1
standard [OGC04]. Note that the elements belonging to the name space associ-
ated with the <SpatialTemporalAssertion> element are prefixed with ’sta:’;
types from GML are prefixed with ’gml:’ and types from SAML are prefixed
with ’saml:’. Future extensions of the SAML-based spatial-temporal certificate
may be specified with new attribute statements (this approach may also be used
in the X.509-based structure).
(a) X.509 AC extension (b) SAML extension
Fig. 3. Main extension elements to support basic spatial-temporal certificates
4 Conclusions and Future Work
Frameworks are important instruments for the security research community. A
framework for a security service usually defines its goals, its general provision
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models and the requirements it should fulfill. Security frameworks may also de-
scribe specific mechanisms that allow the service provision. Recent development
of location-based services has originated a set of new security services that ad-
dress specific security problems for this context. Spatial-temporal certification
services stand among these new services. In the last decade several authors have
proposed spatial-temporal certification models and mechanisms [ZKK01, Bus04],
but none of them addresses the definition of a general spatial-temporal frame-
work. This work addresses the definition of such a spatial-temporal certification
framework. A brief discussion on the mechanisms that may be used to pro-
vide spatial-temporal certification services is also presented. Authors do not
have addressed an exhaustive definition of the framework, instead an initial but
grounded baseline is presented in order to be used as discussion starting point.
Furthermore, two specific spatial-temporal certificate formats are also proposed,
based respectively on the X.509 AC framework and the SAML standard.
Lots of open issues remain unaddressed. A more general format of spatial
information, able of representing different geographic places and semantic loca-
tions and taking into account interoperatibility issues, is needed. Both struc-
tures have to be extended to address requirement block 3, including in the
framework privacy-enhancing certificates. Besides, integration with location au-
thentication protocols should be properly analyzed. Finally, implementations of
spatial-temporal certification service demonstrators must be developed. We are
currently working on such an implementation, which will issue, at first, SAML-
based certificates; privacy requirements are being addressed with an access con-
trol system based on generalized role-based access control model [MA01].
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